U-20's log: Additions and cover-up

Notes:
This video is not intended to blame any one person or nation for the disaster. The United States, Britain, and Germany each had guilt and each set out to cover their tracks while blaming one another.
This video is intended to look at one of the more drastic actions taken by the Germans, making the U-boat log 'friendly.' It's possible that the log wasn't altered, but I, along with others, think it was.

Just the fact that Lucy was listed under the "Auxiliary Cruiser" heading of the recognition book should not be dismissed. She was, in fact, built as such.

Great video. In any service falsifying a log is a serious charge/offense/accusation. There have been officer's who have been dismissed or demoted for a guilty judgment.

Pretty nice, I am doing well, still determining on how to visualize Musashi, for my animation, and reading up on Leyte, for the comic on Musashi, and Leyte Gulf.
Take care, and all the best.

Thanks for the cool Documentary.

Kudos Crosser! This was a really well researched and well made video. I was aware of this controversy, but you brought up details I hadn't heard before.
However, there is one area or specific rumor that I strongly disagree with. The idea that U-boat command told or ordered Kapitänleutnant Schwieger to "wait for the Lusitania." This is an order they simply would not have given and I will state why below. What is much more likely is that U-boat command told Schwieger that he should look for the Lusitania, that the ocean liner would probably pass through the Irish Sea on its way to Liverpool and he might have an opportunity to attack it.
There are three reasons why Kapitänleutnant Schwieger's superior officers would not have ordered him on a specific mission to find a place to "wait for the Lusitania." The first reason is they would have had no way of knowing if the Lusitania might be ordered to divert its course to another port or sail to the North of Ireland. The Royal Navy could have told Cunard to send a message to the Lusitania to divert it from its normal passage. The second reason is the Irish Sea is 70 miles wide. In theory, the Lusitania could have sailed through the Irish Sea without the U-20 ever spotting it. Kapitänleutnant Schwieger had no way of knowing that Captain Turner would stay close to the Irish coast and no way of knowing the Lusitania's captain would take a compass bearing on Old Kinsale Head. The third and perhaps the most compelling reason is that all U-boat commanders had been given an express order not to sit and wait for any major target to appear.
In March of 1915, during the Lusitania's next to last voyage, one U-boat commander had laid in wait in the St. George channel on the direct approach to Liverpool, specifically in hopes of attacking the Lusitania. In doing so he passed up the opportunity to attack two or three other smaller vessels. He hadn't wanted to alert the Royal Navy; and through them Cunard, to his presence. Due to fuel issues he gave up and left about 18 hours before the Lusitania actually arrived in that area. (I don't remember which book I read this incident in, but I do remember that this U-boat commander had written in his vessel's War Diary the reason for his decisions.) Due to this failure U-boat command gave a specific order to all of its commanders to not do this again. When on patrol they were not to wait, and in doing so, pass up an opportunity to attack a legitimate target in hopes of sinking a bigger or better target.
Kapitänleutnant Schwieger followed this order to the letter in the patrol that sank the Lusitania. From the attacks he made on May 6th we can see that he wasn't waiting in a specific location, but was patrolling a specific area. So, I agree that Schwieger must have recognized the Lusitania from the moment he saw it had four funnels; and it is likely he was tipped off that this opportunity might occur, but neither he nor his superior officers would have known that it would occur or given him a specific order to make it happen.
Crosser, you should do a video on the penultimate voyage; the next to last voyage, of the Lusitania. Specifically, you should cover the Royal Navy's failed attempt to provide the Lusitania with a destroyer escort. It's a comedy of errors which would make a great video and is perhaps the major reason why the Royal Navy didn't attempt to escort the Lusitania on what turned out to be its final voyage.

Would have been nice to see a comparison log entry in full. Look at the writing styles and compare

My greatgrandparents were on the ship the survived hence I am here

What a curious case

Shared.

The Lusitania’s cargo manifest shows it was carrying small arms ammunition , correct?

Sent out to be sunk as an outrage target by Churchill. The Germans finally took the bait. German command faking the log for political reasons is quite petty. No wonder the captain didn't put him name on it.

Let me just put in my opinion, since I think there's a lot of historical myths thrown around:
1. Ultimately Lusitania sinking's legitimacy should not be evaluated as an individual event, but an inevitable outcome of a wider policy. Issues like the munitions aboard etc are irrelevant because they are not militarily significant, and are anyway only announced after the ship sunk. Further, other more "innocent" ships were also sunk. The German policy in practice was just pretty indiscriminate.
2. Actual legalities of war were a fluid thing. Does sinking the Lusitania become "legitimate" just because the Germans said they were gonna do it? Does that legitimacy survive them subsequently saying "oopsy, we promise never to do it again"? If you look at the original declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, it's all meally mouthed stuff like "[it will not] always be possible to avert the danger thereby threatened to the crew and passengers". Would a reasonable person look at that and say "oh, they'll torpedo a cruise liner without warning"?
3. Conspiracy theories about Churchill trying to get the ship sunk are very silly.
4. Ultimately I think the question is really quite murky. The intent of blockades is to cause a strategic result through economic strangulation. I think really the right way to evaluate all this is from a proportionality POV. Does the doctrine obtain sufficient strategic outcomes to justify the civilian cost? Is there a reasonable belief that it could?
In that context, a lot of stuff like the munitions and Qboats and etc don't actually matter. Remember that the British were blockading the Germans at the same time. Thus the consensus around everyone is that if it would win the Great War, it is acceptable to inflict significant depredations upon the civilian population. If Lusitania had been carrying zero bullets and just food and clothes, well, it could still be sunk if it would help starve out Britain and win the war. If the Germans were extra nice and let the passengers evacuate, the lives saved would be a drop in the bucket of the millions you are trying to starve into submission.
The issue that makes the Lusitania sinking illegitimate to me, IMO, is that by that measure, the sinkings were both atrocious but also plainly *ineffective*. The British had 21 mil tonnes of shipping to start with, the Germans under unrestricted submarine warfare sunk under 1 million in 6 months, easily exceeded by new construction. In short, it was a failed strategy, and if the Germans had been more careful to not sink cruise liners it wouldn't have failed any more than it did. Thus, it fails the proportionality test - which makes sense because the Germans ditched it. The second bout of submarine warfare in 1917 is much more justifiable.

classic "join the war" false flag, full of holes and poorly scripted.